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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation
Proclamation.1 President Lincoln explained that “all persons held as slaves”
within the rebellious states “shall be then, thenceforward, and forever
free.”2 Subsequently, Congress ratified the Thirteenth Amendment.3 The
Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery (except for criminals), and
Section Two gave Congress the “power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”4 Section Two began the long struggle to criminalize slavery in
the United States.5 This struggle culminated in 18 U.S.C. § 1589 but only
after the Supreme Court, in 1988, defined “involuntary servitude” to mean
1. Proclamation No. 17 (Emancipation Proclamation), 12 Stat. 1268 (Jan. 1, 1863).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 177 (2d Cir. 2002); Douglas
L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 n.14 (“The Thirteenth Amendment was introduced in March 1864,
but failed to receive the two-thirds vote necessary to forward it to the states for ratification. It was
reintroduced in January 1865 and won congressional approval on January 31, 1865, three months prior
to General Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865.”).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
5. Id.
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the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.6
The
Supreme Court’s holding specifically found that the phrase “involuntary
servitude” did not encompass even untoward psychological or financial
pressure.7 As a result, section 1589—the Congressional response to the
Supreme Court’s decision—defines “forced labor” (through the definition
of “serious harm”) so broadly that it infringes on the First Amendment right
to association and criminalizes routine relationships—such as an employer
and employee, a parent and a child, or a teacher and a student.8 The breadth
of the section 1589’s definition of “serious harm” creates a vagueness and
overbreadth conflict with the First Amendment’s Freedom of Association.9
But section 1589’s twin problems of vagueness and overbreadth are readily
resolvable with the addition of an affirmative defense. This proposed
affirmative defense would recognize that routine and socially accepted
pressures, such as those exerted by a parent to a child or a teacher to a
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948 (1988) (“Thus, the
language and legislative history of § 1584 both indicate that its reach should be limited to cases
involving the compulsion of services by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.
Congress chose to use the language of the Thirteenth Amendment in § 1584 and this was the scope of
that constitutional provision at the time § 1584 was enacted.”); Christopher Carey & Sarahfina
Peterson, Trafficking People with Disabilities: A Legal Analysis, 26 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST.
471, 475 n.30 (2020) (“In this case, a dairy farmer, Kozminski, used threats and psychological coercion
to force two intellectually disabled men to work 17-hour days on his property for no pay. . . .
A unanimous Court ruled that the Thirteenth Amendment protected only against legal or physical
coercion.”).
7. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 948.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c); United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 624–26 (6th Cir. 2014). Holding
contrary to the Government’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, the court stated:
Toviave’s treatment of the children was reprehensible, it was not forced labor. Three points
compel this conclusion. First, forcing children to do household chores cannot be forced labor
without reading the statute as making most responsible American parents and guardians into
federal criminals. Second, requiring a child to perform those same chores by means of child abuse
does not change the nature of the work. And third, if it did, the forced labor statute would
federalize the traditionally state-regulated area of child abuse. In short, treating household chores
and required homework as forced labor because that conduct was enforced by abuse either turns
the forced labor statute into a federal child abuse statute, or renders the requirement of household
chores a federal crime.
9. IDK, Inc. v. Cnty. of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It is well established that
Freedom of Association is an ‘inseparable aspect’ of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment and the liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, 78 S. Ct. 1163 (1958).
Moreover, ‘it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political,
economic, religious or cultural matters.’ Id. The protection of the Constitution extends to association
for social as well as political ends.”).
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student, are not criminal acts. But without the addition of such an
affirmative defense, 18 U.S.C. § 1589’s definition of “forced labor” is an
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment right to Freedom of
Association.
II. A HISTORY OF CRIMINALIZATION
While the Emancipation Proclamation and later the Thirteenth
Amendment formally freed most slaves and prohibited the institution of
slavery, the more than one-hundred-year history of sharecropping,10
peonage,11 and legalized segregation12 stifled a meaningful implementation
of the Thirteenth Amendment.13
In 1872, the Supreme Court, in the famous Slaughter-House Cases,
explained the tenuous nature of the country after the Civil War.14 The
Court also explained the efforts to impede the promise of the Emancipation
Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment and wrote:
[N]otwithstanding the formal recognition by [the rebellious] States of the
abolition of slavery, the condition of the slave race[,] . . . without further
10. Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass Incarceration,
104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 934 (2019) (“Moreover, there were virtually no legal protections for newly
freed Blacks from labor exploitation, whether they were freed sharecroppers or newly stamped
‘convicts.’”).
11. In 1905 the Supreme Court defined “peonage” as “a status or condition of compulsory
service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.” Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207,
215 (1905).
12. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540, 542–43 (1896) (“This case turns upon the
constitutionality of an act of the general assembly of the state of Louisiana, passed in 1890, providing
for separate railway carriages for the white and colored races. . . . That it does not conflict with the
thirteenth amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime, is too clear for argument. . . . A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the
white and colored races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must
always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color—has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed, we
do not understand that the thirteenth amendment is strenuously relied upon by the plaintiff in error in
this connection.”).
13. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation,
not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”). In 1807, Congress passed a law that prohibited the
importation of slaves after 1808—the earliest day allowed by Article I of the Constitution. See Sundry
African Slaves v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. 110, 119 (1828) (detailing the history of the slave import ban);
The Emily, 22 U.S. 381, 385 (1824).
14. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872).
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protection of the Federal government, [would] be almost as bad as it was
before. Among the first acts of legislation adopted by several of the States in
the legislative bodies which claimed to be in their normal relations with the
Federal government, were laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous
disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty,
and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value, while
they had lost the protection which they had received from their former owners
from motives both of interest and humanity.15

With President Andrew Johnson’s ineffectual efforts to “reconstruct” the
country following the Civil War16 and the bevy of state laws that “imposed
upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their
rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their
freedom was of little value,”17 it is unsurprising that, in the decades after
the Civil War, there were few meaningful efforts to criminalize slavery
within the United States.18
In the early-twentieth century, Congress enacted laws that criminalized
slavery and went so far as to criminalize outfitting a vessel to participate in
the slave trade—but generally the punishment was forfeiture of the vessel
or a fine.19 In 1948, Congress made it a criminal act to enter into a
conspiracy “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any
State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise
15. Id.
16. Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2153, 2188–89 (1996) (“The faith was soon betrayed when Johnson vetoed the Freedmen’s
Bureau Bill on February 19, 1866, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on March 27, 1866. The Freedmen’s
Bureau bill extended the tenure of the Freedmen’s Bureau and enlarged the Bureau’s legal power to
establish and protect blacks’ civil rights in the South. The Civil Rights bill conferred on all blacks
national and state citizenship and guaranteed them a number of crucial civil and economic rights,
including the rights to own property, to make contracts, and to sue. The purpose of these two bills
was to invalidate the Southern ‘Black Codes,’ which consisted of numerous restrictions on black
freedom that were implemented by the restored Southern states at the end of 1865 under the pretext
of maintaining social order. Neither of the two bills touched on black voting rights, yet, constitutionally
speaking, they represented a bold and vigorous effort by the Republican Congress to expand the federal
government’s responsibility in protecting the rights of American citizens. Lyman Trumbull (R-Illinois),
author of the two bills and a leader of the moderates in the Senate, conferred with Johnson several
times about this legislation and believed he had the President’s approval. Moderate Republicans like
Rutherford B. Hayes privately wished that Johnson would get back ‘into the bosom of the [Republican]
family again’ by approving these bills. But Johnson branded both bills unconstitutional and
unnecessary.”).
17. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70.
18. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905).
19. 18 U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 246–67 (March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 19, 35 Stat. 1092).
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or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same.”20
And that year Congress passed 18 U.S.C. Section 1584.21 Section 1584
made it a federal crime to knowingly and willfully hold or sell a person into
“involuntary servitude” and imposed a fine of “not more than $5,000 or
imprison[ment of] not more than five years, or both.”22
In 1988 the Supreme Court heard United States v. Kozminski.23 In
Kozminski, the petitioner asked the Court to “determine the meaning of
‘involuntary servitude,’” as that phrase was used in 18 U.S.C. Sections 241
and 1584.24 Prior to Kozminski, the courts had generally held “that
involuntary servitude occurred when a person was coerced into laboring for
another because of a belief that no viable alternatives existed, or no way was
available to avoid continued service or confinement.”25 But in Kozminski,
the “Supreme Court ruled that involuntary servitude should be interpreted
narrowly, [and limited to instances such as] where the victim is forced to
work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical
injury or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.”26
Justice O’Connor explained for the majority:
The Kozminskis were convicted under § 241 for conspiracy to interfere with
the Thirteenth Amendment guarantee against involuntary servitude. . . . [O]ur
task is to ascertain the precise definition of that crime by looking to the scope
of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude specified
in our prior decisions.27

20. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1952).
21. Id. § 1584.
22. Id. This statute was amended to make the penalty twenty years, but as passed in 1948 the
penalty was five years. Law of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 773 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1584 (2018)).
23. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 934 (1988).
24. Id. at 934; Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance to Call It
Property, 17 WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 109, 128 (“Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Kozminiski, it was generally held that involuntary servitude occurred when a person was coerced into
laboring for another because of a belief that no viable alternatives existed, or no way was available to
avoid continued service or confinement.”) (citations omitted).
25. Davis, supra note 24, at 128.
26. Patricia Medige & Catherine Griebel Bowman, U.S. Anti-Trafficking Policy and the J-1 Visa
Program: The State Department’s Challenge from Within, 7 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 103, 136
n.180 (2012).
27. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 941.
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The majority then held that:
While the general spirit of the phrase “involuntary servitude” is easily
comprehended, the exact range of conditions it prohibits is harder to define.
The express exception of involuntary servitude imposed as a punishment for
crime provides some guidance. The fact that the drafters felt it necessary to
exclude this situation indicates that they thought involuntary servitude
includes at least situations in which the victim is compelled to work by law.
Moreover, from the general intent to prohibit conditions “akin to African
slavery,” as well as the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment extends beyond
state action, we readily can deduce an intent to prohibit compulsion through
physical coercion.28

The majority explained that “our precedents clearly define a Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude enforced by the use or
threatened use of physical or legal coercion. The guarantee of freedom from
involuntary servitude has never been interpreted specifically to prohibit
compulsion of labor by other means, such as psychological coercion.”29
The Supreme Court rejected the Government’s broader reading of the
statute and wrote:
The Government has argued that we should adopt a broad construction of
“involuntary servitude,” which would prohibit the compulsion of services by
any means that, from the victim’s point of view, either leaves the victim with
no tolerable alternative but to serve the defendant or deprives the victim of
the power of choice. Under this interpretation, involuntary servitude would
include compulsion through psychological coercion as well as almost any
other type of speech or conduct intentionally employed to persuade a
reluctant person to work.
This interpretation would appear to criminalize a broad range of day-today activity. For example, the Government conceded at oral argument that,
under its interpretation, § 241 and § 1584 could be used to punish a parent
who coerced an adult son or daughter into working in the family business by
threatening withdrawal of affection. It has also been suggested that the
Government’s construction would cover a political leader who uses charisma
to induce others to work without pay or a religious leader who obtains
personal services by means of religious indoctrination. As these hypotheticals
suggest, the Government’s interpretation would delegate to prosecutors and
28. Id. at 942 (citing Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332–33; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
29. Id. at 944.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 4, Art. 3

952

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:945

juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type of coercive
activities are so morally reprehensible that they should be punished as crimes.
It would also subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory
prosecution and conviction.
Moreover, as the Government would interpret the statutes, the type of
coercion prohibited would depend entirely upon the victim’s state of mind.
Under such a view, the statutes would provide almost no objective indication
of the conduct or condition they prohibit, and thus would fail to provide fair
notice to ordinary people who are required to conform their conduct to the
law. The Government argues that any such difficulties are eliminated by a
requirement that the defendant harbor a specific intent to hold the victim in
involuntary servitude. But in light of the Government’s failure to give any
objective content to its construction of the phrase “involuntary servitude,”
this specific intent requirement amounts to little more than an assurance that
the defendant sought to do “an unknowable something.”
In short, we agree with Judge Friendly’s observation that
“[t]he most ardent believer in civil rights legislation might not
think that cause would be advanced by permitting the awful
machinery of the criminal law to be brought into play whenever
an employee asserts that his will to quit has been subdued by a
threat which seriously affects his future welfare but as to which
he still has a choice, however painful.”
Accordingly, we conclude that Congress did not intend § 1584 to
encompass the broad and undefined concept of involuntary servitude urged
upon us by the Government.30

Thus, Kozminski rejected the established-common-law meaning of
“involuntary servitude” and instead construed “involuntary servitude” in a
way the Court believed was “consistent with the understanding of the
Thirteenth Amendment that prevailed at the time of § 1584’s enactment.”31
This new definition was far more constrained than the historically accepted
meaning.32
Kozminski’s narrow definition of “involuntary servitude” under the
Thirteenth Amendment produced Congressional outrage and public distain
and culminated in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000
30. Id. at 949–50 (alteration in original).
31. Id. at 945.
32. Id. at 945; United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Kozminski limited
the definition of involuntary servitude to ‘physical’ or ‘legal’ coercion.”).
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(TVPA).33 The TVPA specifically repudiated Kozminski’s narrow definition
of “involuntary servitude,” but the new definition broadened the definition
so significantly that it violates the First Amendment right to Freedom of
Association.34
III. THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT OF 2000
In 18 U.S.C. § 1589, the TVPA created the offense of “Forced Labor.”
This section most directly repudiated Kozminski’s narrow definition of
“involuntary servitude.” Section 1589 undid Kozminski by criminalizing
33. Richard Carelli, Court Rules for Michigan Farm Family Accused of Enslaving Retarded Men,
AP (June 29, 1988), https://apnews.com/article/68953e7579aedc3c64b3c2217ced7d43 [https://per
ma.cc/BE5B-2NVY] (“The Supreme Court, ruling for a Michigan farm family accused of enslaving
two retarded men for more than 10 years, said today that illegal involuntary servitude cannot be
imposed through psychological coercion alone. By a 9-0 vote, the justices rejected Reagan
administration arguments that the legal definition of involuntary servitude should be broad enough to
include psychological coercion. If the court had agreed with federal prosecutors, the broader definition
of involuntary servitude - outlawed by the Constitution’s 13th Amendment, which abolished slavery
and by federal law - could have jeopardized certain cult groups or religious orders that use psychological
persuasion to enlist and retain members.”); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-939, at 100–01 (2000); William
Wilber Force Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 154 Cong. Rec. H10888,
H10904; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 2000 Enacted H.R. 3244,
106 Enacted H.R. 3244, 114 Stat. 1464, 1467 (“Involuntary servitude statutes are intended to reach
cases in which persons are held in a condition of servitude through nonviolent coercion. In United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), the Supreme Court found that section 1584 of title 18, United
States Code, should be narrowly interpreted, absent a definition of involuntary servitude by Congress.
As a result, that section was interpreted to criminalize only servitude that is brought about through use
or threatened use of physical or legal coercion, and to exclude other conduct that can have the same
purpose and effect.”); Joseph v. Signal Int’l, No. 1:13-CV-324, 2015 WL 1262286, at *15 (E.D. Tex.
2015) (“Congress, however, expressly repudiated Kozminski’s narrow definition of involuntary
servitude with the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.
Kiwanuka, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16 (‘Kozminski is not controlling, as Congress has specifically
addressed the Kozminski decision and rejected it as too narrow.’). This Act broadened the definition of
involuntary servitude to ‘include cases in which persons are held in a condition of servitude through
nonviolent coercion.’ See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1446, 1467 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101).”); United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d
145, 150 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Adopted in 2000 as part of a broader set of provisions—the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 1464—section 1589 was intended expressly
to counter United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 101 L. Ed. 2d 788, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988).”).
34. Jennifer M. Chacon, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human
Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2999 (2006) (“The TVPA thus codified the broad interpretation
of coercion suggested by the language, if not the holding, of Kozminski at 18 U.S.C. 1589.”); Jennifer
A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, The Missing “P”: Prosecution, Prevention, Protection, and Partnership in the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 443, 451–52 (2012) (“In response to the inadequacies of
the existing law in combating modern-day trafficking, and persuaded by the growing anti-trafficking
rhetoric around the world, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000.”).
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labor or services secured by “serious harm” or threats of “serious harm.”35
It is the definition of “serious harm” that infringes on the First Amendment
right to Freedom of Association. The statute defines “serious harm” as:
(2) The term “serious harm” means any harm, whether physical or nonphysical,
including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently
serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable
person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or
to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that
harm.36

This definition repudiates Kozminski’s emphasis on physical restraint or
threats of legal process and instead incudes “any harm,” whether the harm
is “physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or
reputational harm,” provided that the harm “is sufficiently serious, under all
the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same
background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue
performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm.”37
The definition of “serious harm,” while addressing the problems from
Kozminski’s narrow definition, is overly broad and vague and infringes on
the First Amendment right to the Freedom of Association.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION:
VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
A. First Amendment and Constitutional Challenges
The Supreme Court has routinely explained that “[p]erhaps the most
important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law
is whether [the law] threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free
speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”38
The Fifth Circuit recently explained:
Though not expressly included in the text of the amendment, “[i]mplicit in
the right to engage in First Amendment-protected activities is ‘a
35.
36.
37.
38.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2), (a)(4), (c)(2) (2012).
Id. § 1589(c)(2).
Id.
Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
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corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.’” The
Supreme Court has identified two classes of associations endowed with First
Amendment protection: expressive associations and intimate associations.39

According to these Courts, the “intimate human relationships” in the
second category of protected “associations” “include marriage, the
begetting and bearing of children, child rearing and education, and
cohabitation with relatives.”40
In Rotary Club of Duarte, the Supreme Court elaborated on the First
Amendment right to Freedom of Association and wrote:
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into and carry on certain
intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected
by the Bill of Rights. Such relationships may take various forms, including the
most intimate. . . . We have not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of
this type of constitutional protection. The intimate relationships to which we
have accorded constitutional protection include marriage, . . . the begetting
and bearing of children, . . . child rearing and education, . . . and cohabitation
with relatives. . . . Of course, we have not held that constitutional protection
is restricted to relationships among family members. We have emphasized
that the First Amendment protects those relationships, including family
relationships, that presuppose “deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one’s life.”41

Thus, the personal associations that are entitled to First Amendment
protection are those that are distinguished by such attributes as a relative
smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the
affiliation, and a seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship;
39. Mote v. Walthall, 902 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2018). See also Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19,
23–24 (1989) (discussing how an age and hour restriction ordinance for the purpose of preventing
“potentially detrimental influences” violates a minor’s First Amendment associational rights); see also
IDK, Inc. v. Cnty. of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It is well established that freedom
of association is an ‘inseparable aspect’ of the freedom of speech protected by the first
amendment . . . .” (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958))).
40. Caleb v. Grier, 598 F. App’x 227, 237 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)).
41. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
619–20 (1984)).
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these relationships, such as family relationships, are “distinctively personal
aspects of one’s life.”42 “Conversely, an association lacking these
qualities—such as a large business enterprise—is remote from the concerns
giving rise to this constitutional protection.”43
But courts recognize that the First Amendment right to intimate human
relationships exists beyond the family and into the context of a relatively
small social club. The Fifth Circuit recognized that even such social clubs
are entitled to “enjoy the fullest protection of their right to private
association [under the First Amendment]” because:
[T]he Clubs . . . [are] [r]elatively small in size, they seek to maintain an
atmosphere in which their members can enjoy the comradery and congeniality
of one another. Employing very restrictive guest and admission policies, they
seek to remain isolated. In light of the undisputed facts, including the isolated
dues payments by a single employer, we conclude, as did the district court,
that the Clubs constitute organizations whose location on the spectrum of
personal attachments places them near those that are “most intimate.”
Accordingly, they enjoy the fullest protection of their right of private
association.44

B. Vagueness and Overbreadth
1.

Vagueness

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”45 Supreme Court
precedent establishes that “the Government violates this guarantee by
taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague
that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or
so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”46 The prohibition of
vagueness in criminal statutes “is a well-recognized requirement, consonant

42. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 619.
43. Id.
44. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1497–98 (5th Cir.
1995).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
46. United States v. Anderton, 901 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983))).
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alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law[,]” and a
statute that flouts it “violates the first essential of due process.”47
“A statutory provision is facially vague when it is plagued with such
‘hopeless indeterminacy’ that it precludes ‘fair notice of the conduct it
punishes.’ . . . A facially vague provision is ‘so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement.’”48
2.

Overbreadth

In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court recognizes a “type
of facial challenge,” whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if “a
‘substantial number’ of its applications are unconstitutional, ‘judged in
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”49 The doctrine seeks to
balance competing social costs.50 On the one hand, the threat of
enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from engaging in a
constitutionally protected activity. However, “invalidating a law that in
some of its applications is perfectly constitutional—particularly a law
47. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
48. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 190 (5th Cir. 2018). See also CPR for Skid Row v.
City of L.A., 779 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2015) (“‘[W]here a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas
of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. Uncertain
meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked.’”); see also Dan L. Burk, Patents and the First Amendment, 96 WASH.
U. L. REV. 197, 256–57 (2018) (explaining how vagueness invites governmental intrusion on civil
liberties).
49. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008); see also
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292–93 (2008) (stating “a statute’s overbreadth [must] be
substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”).
The Supreme Court has applied overbreadth to the First Amendment Freedom of Association. See
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967) (holding a section of the Subversive Activities Control
Act unconstitutional under the First Amendment right of association); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
490 (1960) (invalidating a statute that required teachers to disclose every organization which he or she
has associated with over a five-year time frame); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 639 (1984)
(upholding an act that compelled an all-men organization to allow women to join as regular members);
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619 (1971) (upholding an ordinance that made it a crime for “three
persons or more to assemble on any of the sidewalks and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by”); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (holding
in favor of New York City’s law, which sought to prevent an association from using discriminatory
measures for determining membership); City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1999) (affirming
the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding that found a gang loitering ordinance impermissibly vague and
therefore unconstitutional because the ordinance did not draw a distinction between innocent conduct
and potentially harmful conduct); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, __U.S.__, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1584
n.* (2020).
50. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119–20 (2003). See generally Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making
Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L. REV. 853 (1991) (explaining the history and concept of overbreadth).
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directed at conduct so antisocial that it has been made criminal—has
obvious harmful effects.”51 To “maintain an appropriate balance,” the
Supreme Court requires that a “statute’s overbreadth be substantial, not only
in an absolute sense but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate
sweep.”52
In 2010, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge under the First
Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 48, a law designed to criminalize “animal
crushing.”53 According to the Court, this section established a criminal
penalty for anyone who:
[K]nowingly “creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty,” if done
“for commercial gain” in interstate or foreign commerce. A depiction of
“animal cruelty” is defined as one “in which a living animal is intentionally
maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed,” if that conduct violates
federal or state law where “the creation, sale, or possession takes place.”54

In conducting the analysis, the Court wrote:
We read § 48 to create a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth. To begin
with, the text of the statute’s ban on a ‘‘depiction of animal cruelty’’ nowhere
requires that the depicted conduct be cruel. That text applies to ‘any . . .
depiction’ in which ‘a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated,
tortured, wounded, or killed.’ ‘[M]aimed, mutilated, [and] tortured’ convey
cruelty, but ‘wounded’ or ‘killed’ do not suggest any such limitation.55

The Court made a final, important point. In Stevens, the government
argued—as it might in the face of a challenge to section 1589(c)(2)’s
definition of “serious harm”—that it would only prosecute under this act in
cases of “‘extreme’ cruelty.”56 The Court rejected this argument and
explained, “the First Amendment protects against the Government; it does
not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. We would not uphold an
unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it
responsibly.”57
51.
52.
53.
54.
original).
55.
56.
57.

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292–93 (2008).
Id. (emphasis in original).
18 U.S.C. § 48 (2019).
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 465 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 48) (alterations in
Id. at 474 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 48).
Id. at 480 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 48).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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V. PROBLEM WITH THE DEFINITION OF “SERIOUS HARM” UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
A. Definition of Serious Harm from the Forced Labor Act and First Amendment
Implications
The Forced Labor statute makes an act criminal:
(a) [When a person] knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a
person by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means—” . . .
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or
another person; . . .
or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person
to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that
person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint,
shall be punished as provided under subsection (d). . . .
(c) In this section: . . .
(2) The term “serious harm” means any harm, whether physical or
nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that
is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel
a reasonable person of the same background and in the same
circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in
order to avoid incurring that harm.58

Sections 1589(a)(2), (a)(4), and (c)(2) are unconstitutional violations of the
First Amendment right to Freedom of Association because the definition
of the term “serious harm” is so broad and thus so vague that it
encompasses many of most fundamental of human relationships including
the right to have a child. Thus the definition of “serious harm,” violates the
First Amendment right to Freedom of Association by, for example,
requiring a person to choose between not having a child or young person in
their home and having a child or young person in their home and raising
that child or young person in a responsible way and violating the Forced
Labor statute.59 The definition of “serious harm” would not provide any
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2)(2008) (“[A]ny harm, whether physical or nonphysical . . .
sufficiently serious . . . to compel a reasonable person . . . to perform or to continue performing labor
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reasonable person with the information to determine whether his conduct
in raising a child was illegal.60
A statute is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment (as
opposed to other amendments which labor under a different burden) when
the statute or regulation “might operate unconstitutionally under some
conceivable set of circumstances.”61
The Constitution protects choices to enter into and maintain certain
intimate human relationships against undue intrusion by the state and as a
fundamental element of personal liberty included in the First
Amendment.62 It is this freedom that section 1589’s definition of “serious
harm” intrudes upon.
Section 1589(c)(2) defines “serious harm” as:
•

any harm,

•

whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or
reputational harm,

•

that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to
compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same
circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in
order to avoid incurring that harm.63

This expansive definition adopts the Government’s interpretation of the
meaning of the phrase “involuntary servitude” from Kozminski.64 The
Supreme Court explained the Government’s interpretation of “involuntary
servitude” and wrote:
The Government has argued that we should adopt a broad construction of
“involuntary servitude,” which would prohibit the compulsion of services by
any means that, from the victim’s point of view, either leaves the victim with
no tolerable alternative but to serve the defendant or deprives the victim of
the power of choice. Under this interpretation, involuntary servitude would

or services in order to avoid incurring that harm.”) (including any harm which compels a person to
continue or begin performing services to be “serious harm”).
60. See id. § 1589(a)(2), (a)(4), and (c)(2) (encompassing a broad range of behavior in its
definition of “serious harm”) (providing an uncertain standard for its definition of “serious harm”).
61. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2), (a)(4), (c)(2).
62. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23 (1989).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2).
64. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948 (1988).
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include . . . almost any other type of speech or conduct intentionally employed
to persuade a reluctant person to work.65

The Court then rejected the Government’s interpretation of the statute.66
In rejecting the Government’s argument, the Court explained that the
Government’s interpretation would “criminalize a broad range of day-today activity” and “[i]t would also subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary
or discriminatory prosecution and conviction.”67
The Supreme Court’s reasoning from Kozminski applies to the definition
of “serious harm,” because the definition is so uncertain that it “would
include . . . almost any other type of speech or conduct intentionally
employed to persuade a reluctant person to work” and because the
definition “delegate[s] to prosecutors and juries the inherently legislative
task of determining what type of coercive activities are so morally
reprehensible that they should be punished as crimes[.] [This definition also]
subject[s] individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution
and conviction[.]”68
Hypothetical situations illustrate the problems with section 1589’s
definition of “serious harm.” Under this definition a person would commit
the offense of Forced Labor if:
•

A parent who knowingly requires his or her five-year old child to
clean up Legos that the child has been playing with or risk having
the parent pick up the Lego and then “put it away” and not allow
the child to play with the Lego for three days, if this coercive act
was sufficient to compel a reasonable person of the same
background and in the same circumstances as the five-year old to
clean up the Legos to avoid the parent taking the Legos for three
days. Because the Forced Labor statue permits the prosecution of
a parent who knowingly secures the labor of their five-year old child
by means of “threats of serious harm,” and because the definition
of “serious harm” is so vague, the statute impinges on the hypothetical
parents’ rights, in the most intimate of associations, to First
Amendment association. And because no parent could raise a child
without such coercive efforts, and because as society we encourage

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 949.
Id.
Id.
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2).
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such coercive efforts, the parents would have no reason to believe
that their conduct violated the statute;
•

A family who hires an au pair to help with childcare, the au pair is
poor, and the au pair is from a country where the American Dollar
is an especially valued commodity. This au pair does not want to
work Saturday or Sunday mornings. But the parents have an
unusually active social schedule and they are often out late on Friday
and Saturday nights and want childcare in the mornings. If these
parents knowingly compel the au pair to work these mornings at the
risk of being replaced, then these parents could be charged with
Forced Labor for knowingly obtaining the labor of the au pair by
“threats of serious harm.” Thus, the statute impinges on the
hypothetical parents’/employer’s rights, in the most intimate of
associations, to First Amendment association if this coercive act
would compel a reasonable person of the same background and in
the same circumstances as the au pair to perform the demanded
labor to avoid losing her job. And because a parent must be able to
control when their child will be cared for by an au pair the
parents/employer would have no reason to believe that their
conduct was criminal law;

•

A talented new lawyer who has secured a prestigious clerkship but
the judge knowingly requires the clerk to stay late and work extended
hours or lose her clerkship which would endanger the employee’s
reputation if this coercive act would compel a reasonable person of
the same background and in the same circumstances as the young
lawyer to do the demanded work. In such an instance the judge
could be charged with violating the Forced Labor statute. And
because a judge must be able to control her docket, the judge would
have no reason to believe that her conduct violated any criminal law;
and,

•

A college professor in a required but small graduate school seminar
knowingly required a student to read a book and prepare a review on
that book or risk receiving a failing grade, if this coercive act would
compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the
same circumstances as the hapless graduate student to read the book
and write the review to avoid receiving a failing grade and being
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removed from his or her graduate program ignominiously. Thus,
the statute impinges on the hypothetical professor’s rights, in the
most intimate of associations, to First Amendment association.
And because a professor must be able to control the assignments to
his or her students the professor would have no reason to believe
that her conduct was criminal.
Under any of these hypotheticals, when all of the surrounding
circumstances are considered, any reasonable person in these circumstances
would be compelled to perform the labor or service to avoid incurring the
resulting “harm,” whether it is “psychological, financial, or reputational.”69
But the actor who is knowingly using the “threat of serious harm” or actual
“serious harm” to secure the labor would not have fair notice that their
conduct was criminal because the statute “is plagued with such ‘hopeless
indeterminacy’ that it precludes ‘fair notice of the conduct it punishes’” and
it “invites arbitrary enforcement.”70
Further, these hypotheticals are examples of day-to-day activities that are
the essence of decisions to enter into and to maintain certain intimate
human relationships (have a child, hire help to care for that child, employ
an employee in a small office, or to teach a small graduate school seminar)
that are secured against intrusion by the state and receive protection as a
fundamental element of personal liberty under the First Amendment’s
protection for Freedom of Association.71
Moreover, section (a)(4) dilutes the definition of “serious harm” further
because, in section (a)(4), a person can be convicted if he knowingly secures
the labor or service of another by:
(4) means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to
believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person
or another person would suffer serious harm . . . , [resulting in] punish[ment]
as provided under subsection (d).72

Such a “pattern” might include an agreement between parents to support
each other when one parent disciplines their child appropriately—such as
taking away Legos for three days after a child refused to clean up his or her
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 190 (5th Cir. 2018).
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23 (1989).
18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(4).
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Legos.73 But such a “pattern” or “plan” could easily be constructed to apply
in a workplace or school.
Under the statutory definition of “serious harm,” the Forced Labor
statute intrudes on this First Amendment right to association, particularly
the choice to enter into and maintain intimate human relationships.74
Specifically, the definition of “serious harm” is so vague that no reasonable
person who decided to bring a young person into their home (whether
through birth, adoption, or even for a temporary stay) would be on notice
that their conduct in correcting the young person or in raising that young
person violated the “Forced Labor” statute. In its current form, the statute
requires parents to decide whether to exclude children or young people from
their home and to be safe from violating this statute or whether to have a
child or young person and to raise that child or young person in a
responsible way and likely violate the Forced Labor act. Further, in any of
the hypothetical situations provided supra, the Forced Labor statute violates
the First Amendment.75
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to find statutes that include a
scienter requirement unconstitutionally vague.76 But the usual concern
about scienter and vagueness does not apply to this argument. In this
instance, the force or coercion used in any of the hypotheticals would have
occurred “knowingly.”77 But none of the hypothetical individuals who
compelled the labor would have had the required notice that the knowing
demand for the labor or service and the acts that compelled the labor or
service would have been illegal. As in Stevens, the usual concern about
scienter and vagueness does not apply here.78
For this reason, 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2), (a)(4), and (c)(2) are
unconstitutionally vague.79

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 662 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[To mount
a facial attack] in the First Amendment context, . . . the challenger need only show that a statute or
regulation ‘might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances.’”).
76. Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc. 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
77. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 465 (2010).
78. Id.
79. Carmouche, 449 F.3d at 662.
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Invitation for Arbitrary Enforcement

The statutory definition of “serious harm” also necessitates arbitrary
enforcement—as the Supreme Court anticipated in Kozminski.80 In
Kozminski, the Court hypothesized that the Government’s broad
interpretation of the statute would criminalize “a broad range of day-to-day
activity.”81 The Court continued and argued that under the Government’s
theory, “§ 1584 could be used to punish a parent who coerced an adult son
or daughter into working in the family business by threatening withdrawal
of affection.”82 And the Court concluded:
As these hypotheticals suggest, the Government’s interpretation would
delegate to prosecutors and juries the inherently legislative task of determining
what type of coercive activities are so morally reprehensible that they should
be punished as crimes. It would also subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary
or discriminatory prosecution and conviction.83

Under the Force Labor Statute, “serious harm” is:
any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial,
or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding
circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in
the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or
services in order to avoid incurring that harm.84

Under this definition any parent who knowingly conditioned a teenaged
child’s ability to participate in some important or significant social activity
(such as a homecoming dance) on mowing the grass, helping around the
home, assisting with siblings, or even cleaning their own room would likely
violate the statute.85 The parent’s conduct would violate the statute if the
requirement that the teenaged child do the “labor” or “service” was
“sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a
reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances
to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949 (1988).
Id.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (2012).
Id.
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incurring that harm.”86 Yet such parental direction is routine and even
encouraged.87
There is no case in which a parent was charged with “Forced Labor” for
conditioning participation in a significant social event on such a “labor” or
“service.” But, as the Supreme Court explained in Stevens, “the First
Amendment protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the
mercy of noblesse oblige. We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute
merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.”88
Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2), (a)(4), and (c)(2) are unconstitutionally
vague because they invite arbitrary enforcement.
2.

Overbroad

In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court recognizes “a
second type of facial challenge,” whereby a law may be invalidated as
overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”89
Here the Forced Labor statute relies on a definition of “serious harm”
which means
•

any harm;

•

whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial,
or reputational harm; and,

•

that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances,
to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the
same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or
services in order to avoid incurring that harm.90

The statute includes a scienter requirement, but, as in Stevens, the
requirement that the act occur “knowingly” does not change the
overbreadth analysis.91

86. Id.
87. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 626 (2014) (“But it has always been true that
parents can make their children perform this kind of work.”).
88. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 465 (2010).
89. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008); United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292–93 (2008).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2).
91. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464–65.
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Instead, here, as in Stevens, the Forced Labor statute “create[s] a criminal
prohibition of alarming breadth.”92 Under this statute, as explained supra,
a huge variety of constitutionally protected conduct associated with the
raising of children, the supervision of employees, the education of children
or adults, the rehabilitation of prisoners, the training of aspiring soldiers, etc.
all fall within the purview of the criminal aspects of this statute.
For these reasons, 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2), (a)(4), and (c)(2) are overbroad
and unconstitutional.
B. Conclusion
The definition of “serious harm” is both unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. The definition requires citizens to choose between deciding not
to make the most basic and fundamental decisions to associate with
others—as they are guaranteed the right to do under the First
Amendment—or to make these associations and to risk violating the
“Forced Labor.” These hapless citizens would violate the statute through
deliberate action without the required notice, would risk punishment
through arbitrary enforcement of the statute, or would risk punishment for
protected activities. For these reasons, 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2), (a)(4), and
(c)(2) are vague and overbroad.
VI. CHALLENGES TO THE DEFINITION OF “SERIOUS HARM”
The constitutionality of section 1589’s definition of “serious harm,” has
been challenged in the courts, but the challenges have been uniformly
unsuccessful. But, with one exception, the definition has not been
challenged as a violation of the First Amendment right to Freedom of
Association, with one exception.93
A. United States v. Toviave
In Toviave, the Sixth Circuit faced a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction for “Forced Labor” under section 1589.
The Court found the evidence insufficient due to the problems with the
definition of “serious harm” and wrote:

92. Id. at 474.
93. The exception is United States v. Toure, 965 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2020). In Toure, the
constitutional challenge was brought under the rubric of the First Amendment but was unsuccessful
because it was raised for the first time on appeal and did not clear the bar for “plain error.” Id. at 400.
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Defendant Toviave brought four young relatives from Togo to live with him
in Michigan. After they arrived, Toviave made the children cook, clean, and
do the laundry. He also occasionally made the children babysit for his
girlfriend and relatives. Toviave would beat the children if they misbehaved
or failed to follow one of Toviave’s many rules. While his actions were
deplorable, Toviave did not subject the children to forced labor. The mere
fact that Toviave made the children complete chores does not convert
Toviave’s conduct—what essentially amounts to child abuse—into a federal
crime. Toviave’s federal forced labor conviction must accordingly be
reversed.
Toviave immigrated to the United States from Togo in 2001 and eventually
settled in Michigan. In 2006, he contacted Helene Adoboe, a girlfriend
(sometimes referred to as his wife) from Togo, and asked that she and four
children—Gaelle, Rene, Kwami, and Kossiwa—come and live with him in
the United States. Kossiwa is Toviave’s younger sister, Gaelle and Rene are
Toviave’s cousins (although their degree of consanguinity is unclear), and
Kwami is Adoboe’s nephew. Adoboe and the children managed to enter the
United States with false immigration documents. Adoboe initially lived with
Toviave, but their relationship quickly soured, and the two separated in 2008.
Toviave apparently demanded absolute obedience from the children and was
quick to beat them. Toviave hit the children with his hands, and with plunger
sticks, ice scrapers, and broomsticks, often for minor oversights or violations
of seemingly arbitrary rules. For example, Gaele testified that Toviave hit her
in the face for using loose-leaf paper rather than a notebook to do her
homework, and Kossiwa recounted an incident where Toviave hit her with a
broomstick for throwing a utensil in the sink.
The children were responsible for different household chores. Toviave made
the children cook, clean, and do the laundry. He also made the children pack
up the house when the family moved to a new apartment, serve food to
Toviave’s guests, iron Toviave’s clothes, and clean his van. Toviave also
occasionally made the children babysit for the women he was dating, or for
his relatives.94

Toviave concerned a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and did
not include a challenge to the constitutionality of the forced labor statute.95
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit wrote:

94. United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 624 (6th Cir. 2014).
95. Id. at 630.
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Although Toviave’s treatment of the children was reprehensible, it was not
forced labor. Three points compel this conclusion. First, forcing children to
do household chores cannot be forced labor without reading the statute as
making most responsible American parents and guardians into federal
criminals. Second, requiring a child to perform those same chores by means
of child abuse does not change the nature of the work. And third, if it did,
the forced labor statute would federalize the traditionally state-regulated area
of child abuse. In short, treating household chores and required homework
as forced labor because that conduct was enforced by abuse either turns the
forced labor statute into a federal child abuse statute, or renders the
requirement of household chores a federal crime.96

And the Court provided a hypothetical situation to explain the problem
with the government’s theory of the case. The Court wrote:
The government’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 would make a federal
crime of the exercise of these innocuous, widely accepted parental rights.
Take a hypothetical parent who requires his child to take out the garbage,
make his bed, and mow the lawn. The child is quarrelsome and occasionally
refuses to do his chores. In response, the child’s parent sternly warns the
child, and if the child still refuses, spanks him. The child then goes about
doing his chores. There is no principled way to distinguish between that sort
of hypothetical labor and what Toviave made the children do in this case.
Both the tasks assigned to the child by the hypothetical parent and the duties
assigned by Toviave are ‘labor’ in the economic sense of the word: one could,
and people often do, pay employees to perform these types of domestic
tasks.97

Ultimately, the Court found the evidence insufficient to support a
conviction for forced labor and wrote:
The line between required chores and forced labor may be a fine one in some
circumstances, but that cannot mean that all household chores are forced
labor, with only the discretion of prosecutors protecting thoughtful parents
from federal prosecution. The facts of this case fall on the chores side of the
line.98

96. Id. at 625.
97. Id. at 625–26.
98. Id. at 630.
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Thus, although Toviave did not address constitutional arguments, the
reasoning illustrates the constitutional infirmity of Section 1589.
B. United States v. Calimlim
Calimlim is one of the very few cases to address the constitutionality of
the Forced Labor statute.99 In Calimlim, two physicians brought an
adolescent, Irma Martinez, from the Philippines to work for the family in
the United States.100 When Martinez arrived, the family confiscated her
passport and told her that she would have to reimburse them for the cost
of her plane ticket.101 Martinez did not speak English for almost six years
after arriving in the United States.102 The family told Martinez that she was
in the country illegally and the Calimlims rarely allowed Martinez to leave
the home.103 Over nineteen years, “[t]he Calimlims allowed Martinez to
speak with her family four or five times.”104 The Calimlims repeatedly told
Martinez that if law enforcement agents discovered her that she could be
arrested, imprisoned, and deported.105
“On September 29, 2004, federal agents, acting on an anonymous tip,
executed a search warrant and found a trembling Martinez huddled in the
closet of her bedroom.”106 The Government charged the Calimlims with
forced labor and a jury convicted them.107 The Calimlims challenged their
convictions on the basis that the forced labor statute was unconstitutional
as applied to them—and not facially.108 And, importantly, the Calimlims
did not argue that the forced labor statute infringed on their First
Amendment right to Freedom of Association.109
The Seventh Circuit explained that the statute clearly set out the law and
that the question of whether the Calimlims threatened Martinez was a jury
issue.110 And the Court concluded that “as applied to the Calimlims’ case

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709.
Id.
Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 709.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709–10.
Id.
Id. at 713.
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§ 1589 is neither vague nor overbroad.”111 But the deficiency in the
Calimlims’ argument is that they failed to address the statute within the
context of the First Amendment right to Freedom of Association.
C. Other Cases and Conclusion
Other cases have challenged the constitutionality of the forced labor act,
but they have been unsuccessful.112 These cases failed because they did not
raise the constitutional challenge within the context of the First Amendment
right to Freedom of Association.113
VII. REMEDY
The importance of criminalizing forced labor is undisputed, but § 1589
prohibits far more than the unconscionable and the abhorrent, and
incorporates nearly all human relationships—whether professional,
educational, clerical, familial, social, romantic, or platonic. The Congress
could readily remedy the constitutional deficiencies by creating an
affirmative defense for “the procurement of labor through everyday
pressures and demands.” But without the protection of such an affirmative
defense, § 1589 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The current definition of “serious harm” is likely overbroad and vague
and infringes on the First Amendment right to the Freedom of Association.
In its current form, the definition of “serious harm,” goes to many of the
fundamental (but unequal) relationships that define human existence and
culture. The definition of “serious harm” need not revert to the narrow
111. Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 713.
112. United States v. Wiggins, No. EP-11-CR-2420-FM, 2013 WL 12196743, at *2, 2 (W.D.
Tex. Mar. 5, 2013) (“The court . . . concludes that the counts invoking Sections 1589 and 1591 are not
unconstitutionally vague.”); United States v. Sou, No. 09-00345 SOM, 2011 WL 3207265, at *1, *5–8
(D. Haw. July 26, 2011); United States v. Askarkhodjaev, No. 09-00143-01-CR-W-ODS, 2010 WL
4038783, *1, *2–6 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 23, 2010), adopted by, No. 09–00143–01–CR–W–ODS, 2010 WL
4038745 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 2010); see also United States v. Garcia, No. 02-CR-110S-01, 2003 WL
22956917, at *1, *2–6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003).
113. Wiggins, 2013 WL 12196743, at *2; Sou, 2011 WL 3207265, at *5–8; Askarkhodjaev,
2010 WL 4038783, at *2–6, adopted by, 2010 WL 4038745 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 2010); Garcia, 2003 WL
22956917, at *2–6. The exception is Toure. In Toure the constitutional challenge was brought under
the rubric of the First Amendment but was unsuccessful because it was raised for the first time on
appeal and did not clear the bar for “plain error.” United States v. Toure, 965 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir.
2020).
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definition from Kozminski. It should, instead, include an affirmative defense
that permits a defendant to show that the pressure or harm that resulted in
the charge for forced labor is the type of pressure that is widely accepted
and even valued. With this addition, the Forced Labor statute would expand
the offense from the narrow definition in Kozminski but remain
constitutionally sound.
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